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Abstract: This paper discusses the rationales for a Grid market and, in 
particular, the introduction of a market place for trading commoditized 
computing resources. The market place proposed makes computing resources 
from different providers substitutable through virtualization. This includes the 
definition of a spot and future market as well as the parameters that a market 
mechanism for computing resources should consider. The above market place is 
complemented by a set of value-added services (e.g. insurance against resource 
failures, capacity planning, resource quality assurance, stable price offering) 
that ensure quality for Grid users over time. The market place technology for all 
of the above services has been designed by the GridEcon project, contributing 
to a broader adoption of Grid technology and enabling a service-oriented 
knowledge utility environment.  
Keywords: Commercial Grids, Grid Computing, Business Models, Grid 
Economics, Utility Computing, Market Mechanisms, Grid Market Place. 
1 Introduction 
The Grid, as we use it in this paper, is a system of interconnected, virtualized 
computing resources. Those computing resources can be located in a few data centers 
around the world (owned by large enterprises) or can be highly distributed (owned by 
many end-users or small and medium-sized enterprises). These virtualized hardware 
resources provide interfaces to execute software (e.g. applications or middleware). 
There are many vendors that offer different kind of hardware virtualization software 
[14][15]. After the buyer purchased the right to execute the resources, it can upload an 
application or, first, a Grid middleware application and, then, an application on top of 
it. In our definition of the Grid, we explicitly exclude software resources or 
information resources. 
During the past years, a few approaches have been undertaken to offer Grid 
technology for commercial purposes: The most successful approach is the one of 
Amazon, namely Amazon EC2 [1]. Besides this utility computing approach, there are 
three hardware vendors (HP [2], IBM [3], SUN [4]) and one more Internet company 
entered the market (Google [5]) that provides similar utility computing services. Since 
only these few players are in the market, the market structure for utility computing is 
an oligopoly. 
In order to break the oligopoly market structure, GridEcon, an EC-funded project 
[10][11], offers market place technology that allows many (small) providers to offer 
their resources for sale. The effect of a market place for computing resources can be 
illustrated with the following example. If computing resources are scarce due to low 
supply, the market price for computing resources will be high. Enterprises requiring 
resources during high price periods will invest in additional equipment. These 
additional resources can then be externalized when they are not needed, thereby 
increasing the overall capacity available on the market. The income generated by 
selling resources in the Grid market will act as an incentive to sell spare capacity if a 
market place is available.  
The GridEcon project designs the technology that is needed to create an efficient 
market place for trading commoditized computing resources. The market place allows 
every owner of computing resources to offer spare computing resources as a 
standardized virtual machine. The challenge is to design this standardized virtual 
machine, which can be traded on the market place easily and allows establishing a 
competitive market. The market mechanism used has been designed to be simple for 
participants to use, and also economically sound. The later is concerned with inducing 
the right economic incentives to participants and avoiding unwanted strategic 
behavior leading to market dominance by large players. The GridEcon project also 
designed a series of value-added services on top of the market place (e.g. insurance 
against resource failures, capacity planning, resource quality assurance, stable price 
offering), ensuring quality of the traded goods for Grid users. The market place 
technology and the value-added services contribute to a broader adoption of Grid 
technology and enable a service-oriented knowledge utility environment. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the rational for a market 
place for computing resources. In Section 3, the requirements for a spot and future 
market are discussed in detail. This includes the definition of a spot and future market 
as well as the prerequisites for a market mechanism for computing resources. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2 Markets and Market Places for Computing Resources 
In general, a market describes the entirety of all transactions between a buyer and a 
seller in all forms. This includes direct transactions between a buyer and a resource 
provider as well as the transactions performed using the market mechanism provided 
within the market place. A market for computing resources comes into existence if 
there is discontinuous demand and redundancy of computing resources.  
A buyer of a (virtual) computing resource in our Grid market is an entity that 
purchases the right to execute an application on a computing resource. Similarly, a 
seller of a computing resource sells the right of using a computing resource for a 
certain period of time.  
A market place is an environment, which supports buyers and sellers in carrying 
out their trading transactions between each other [13]. The rules of interaction 
between the players in the market place are set through the market mechanism. The 
market place helps finding trading partners more easily by storing information 
centrally and by offering procedures to facilitate the matching between supply and 
demand. It also makes sure that fraudulent transactions do not happen.  
2.1 Rationale for a Market for Computing Resources 
In general, a market for utility computing will only work if one of the following 
conditions are met: (1) the pattern of individual demand for resources show spikes; 
(2) the units of computing power that are needed are smaller than the purchase of a 
computer could provide. In addition to this, all of the following conditions exist: (3) 
adequate technology for implementing utility computing (e.g. definitions of 
standardized interfaces); and (4) none-constraining regulations.  
The demand spikes, which have been mentioned in condition (1), could be a 
consequence of the type of business that the company performs. The business itself 
might bring uncertainty about the need for computing resources. An example for such 
a business could be a company that creates animated movies. When a movie has to be 
rendered, the demand for computing resources is very high, otherwise very low. To 
cover this uncertainty, until now, companies had to over-provision their IT resources, 
which is expensive.  
If condition (2) applies, then, without utility computing, most users would not be 
able to afford computing resources because of the high cost of ownership and their 
sporadic usage patterns. Utility computing allows them to get access to a very large 
quantity of computing resources for a short time on a per-usage basis. 
Condition (3) is a necessity in order to be able to substitute a computing resource 
of one provider with a similar computing resource of another provider. Without this 
condition, the effort to connect to another provider might be too high. In order to 
efficiently use utility computing, technology must be available that helps the provider 
to organize its tremendous amount of computing resources in an efficient way. It must 
be guaranteed that the management cost for using the Grid is not higher than 
administrating resources that are owned.  
Government regulations mentioned in condition (4) can have a huge impact on the 
organization and efficiency of providing computing resources. These regulation issues 
must address areas such as data storage location, taxation, and access rights to 
computing resources. In order to make utility computing successful, a prerequisite is a 
set of supporting regulations.   
If a market for computing resources is not available, an alternative solution is over-
provisioning. That is, a user should have a permanent computing capacity that can 
meet the demand peaks, which in light of condition (1) are much higher than the 
average. However, besides the fact that this would defeat the purpose of utility 
computing, this is beyond the budget of many users and it causes economic waste of 
resource. Another alternative is not to meet all demand for processing resources, 
which consequently leads to missing an opportunity for getting additional revenues. 
2.2 Economic Implications of a Grid Market Place 
The rationale for a market place for computing goods is the current utility 
computing market. It is an oligopoly. The advantage of the few providers of utility 
computing (e.g. Amazon, HP, IBM, Google, Sun) in this oligopoly is that they have 
brand recognition and are trusted entities. However, these few providers offer their 
resources at a price higher than in a competitive market structure.  
A market place provides an alternative to the existing oligopoly of utility 
computing providers in the market. If buyers and sellers accept (i.e. trust) the market 
place for executing their trades, it will increase the supply of computing resources in 
the market. Consequently, It will lower the price for buying computing resources in 
the market. Computing resources become even affordable to enterprises with low 
budget. All quality of service issues would be resolved by the market place. Similar to 
the case of stock exchanges, there could be more than one market place for trading 
computing resources. 
The market place that we envision in GridEcon is an environment that allows 
SMEs to trade their resources. However, there may be also larger companies that will 
benefit from such a market place and its services [12]. For instance, it might be that 
large companies offer their spare capacity at the market place.  
Eventually, we expect to see new business models arise. These business models 
will make entities act as brokers of computing resources to other companies, or offer 
other value-added services, complementing the market services. 
2.3 Services for the Market Place for Computing Resources 
In order to attract customers to the market place and get the market place concept 
accepted by users, the market place must offer a set of services that makes the use of 
the market place service convenient, secure, and less risky. This is the focus of the 
GridEcon project. The services, which we identified to be necessary for a market 
place environment, can be classified into core services and value-added services. The 
market place provider offers the market mechanism service and additional core 
services. These services are described in detail within the next subsection. The value-
added services do not have to be offered by the market place provider but can be 
offered by independent service providers instead. The capacity planning service and 
the insurance service are briefly described in subsection 2.3.2. We are convinced, 
only if these services are present, a market place for commoditized computing 
resources will work. 
2.3.1. Core Services of the Market Place for Computing Resources 
Resource Redundancy  
The market place might provide resource redundancy in order to achieve service 
reliability even if a resource provider dishonors his commitment. The market place 
might also provide extra resources in order to increase the probability of a liquid 
market in times when demand is not matched by supply. In these cases, the market 
place deals with the risk of resource unavailability and will ease the bootstrap of a 
new market place. 
Monitoring of Computing Resource Offers 
In order to assure quality of the good offered (i.e. to assure that customers are 
truthful in declaring their computing resource postings), the market place provider 
may probe randomly the offered, not leased computing resources by running 
benchmark programs on them. In case that the computing resources have been sold on 
the market place, the market place requests ratings from the buyer of the resources, 
using a reputation system. The information within the reputation system is private to 
the market place. It will be used to decide whether to allow resource providers to sell 
goods in the market place in the future.  
Security 
The market place has to provide a secure environment. All communications among 
the market participants and the market place has to be encrypted. The market place 
also has to ensure that no viruses are spread between machines that are traded on the 
market place. It also builds in protection mechanisms that blocks buyers from getting 
access to resources of the provider beyond the border of purchased resources.  
Simplicity 
The market place has to enable access to computing resources in a transparent and 
simple way, using an intuitive user interface. Any transaction on the market place has 
to be simple, including the integration of the resource into the existing IT 
infrastructure of the buyer. 
Anonymity 
The market place has to ensure anonymity of sellers and buyers. This service is 
necessary in order to hide the identity of large providers/sellers. If the identity cannot 
be hidden, buyers and sellers might circumvent the market place and make the market 
transaction directly. If anonymity exists, buyers and sellers cannot trade directly with 
each other and more competition is guaranteed on the market place. However, buyers 
must be given the option of bidding for resources that will be provided by a single 
provider. 
Standardization of Computing Resources 
In order to offer commoditized computing resources, the market place must be able 
to cope with different hardware types available at the sellers’ premises. Therefore, the 
market place requires sellers to virtualize their hardware and to run “standardized” 
virtual machines with certain performance characteristics (as defined by the market 
place provider). The market place accepts only offers of computing resources that 
comply with those performance standards. This makes all hardware resources 
comparable and substitutable. 
The standardized resources are classified in terms of quality (e.g. CPU speed, 
bandwidth, main memory, disk space). However, in order to abstract from the detailed 
specification of the performance characteristics of virtual machines, those 
“standardized” Grid resources are given abstract names such as GEUnit1, GEUnit2, 
or GEUnit3. 
2.3.2. Value-Added Services to the Market Place 
Capacity Planning 
The acceptance of Grid computing also depends on how simple is it to make 
optimized planning decisions about computing resource purchases. Therefore, to 
achieve acceptance, a capacity planning service needs to be in place that supports 
market place participants (i.e. sellers and buyers) in their decision making process for 
selling and buying resources on the market place. The capacity planning service has 
also to help customers on how to optimally shape their demand and to find the 
appropriate resources for their applications. The precision of the prediction of the 
capacity planner is based on input parameters, such as the current load, the past load, 
the current demand, the market price of computing resources, and the existing 
computing capacity.  
Insurance Contracts 
Uncertainty about resource failures can also have an impact on the acceptance of 
the market place. Those market participants, who are risk averse, will not participate 
in the market place if there is uncertainty about resource reliability. To overcome this, 
an insurance service must be in place. The insurance service provides an insurance 
contract to buyers for occurrences of resource failures. In case of a failure of a 
resource, the insurance provider replaces the failed resource with a fault-free resource 
(in case it owns resources) or simply compensates the buyer with the amount of 
money specified in the insurance contract. 
3 Requirements for a Spot and Future Trading 
Stocks are traded in markets called stock exchanges (e.g. New York Stock 
Exchange). Though all exchanges used to require physical presence of traders and 
trading was performed by means of open outcry, most modern stock markets rely on 
automated electronic trading systems. For instance, NASDAQ is an electronic stock 
trading platform, where all trading is done by means of computer systems [6]. 
3.1 Definition of a Spot Market 
 In order to set the requirements for a spot market for computing resources, a 
general definition of spot markets and an example are given. In general, the spot 
market is a securities market, in which goods, both perishable and non-perishable, are 
sold for cash and delivered immediately or within a short period of time. Contracts 
sold on a spot market are also effective immediately. The spot market is also known 
as the “cash market” or “physical market.” Purchases are settled in cash at the price 
set by the market, as opposed to the price at the time of delivery. An example of a 
spot market commodity that is regularly sold is crude oil. Crude Oil is sold at the 
current prices, and physically delivered later .[7]
The emergence of electricity wholesale markets is the consequence of privatization 
of the electrical power production companies. Like computation service, electricity is 
difficult to store (in large quantities), has to be available on demand, and 
(unpredictable) demand spikes may occur. Countries that have chosen to operate 
wholesale electricity markets where power companies offer their electricity output to 
meet the customers demand, have a number of mechanism to choose from. One 
model, which is used by the PJM [16] uses central scheduler to balance supply and 
demand and computes the market price, while the losses over the transmission 
network are also taken into account: At each network node a "shadow price" is 
computed, which reflects the cost of providing an additional MWatt-hour at this node. 
Another model is that of conducting auctions in various time scales, i.e. auctions 
for yearly and daily provision of power, with additional spot market that resolves the 
need for accommodating short-term demand spikes. For example, this model is used 
by the European Energy Exchange (EEX) [17]. 
Finally, the Supply Function Equilibria has also been under investigation as the 
market mechanism of the power grids. It is also worth noting that there are several 
cases where regulators have intervened due to market failure, with the California 
market being the most prominent example [8][9]. 
3.2 Spot Market for Computing Resources 
The spot market for computing resources also enables the trading of computing 
resources “as soon as possible”. It employs a bid and ask mechanism (i.e. a stock 
market-like double auction mechanism) that enables the trading of computational 
power. The underlying principle for this mechanism is that of a standard spot market: 
All parties publicly announce the maximum price they are willing to buy for and the 
minimum price they are willing to sell for. The spot bids (respectively asks) are put in 
the spot queue for bids (respectively asks). Matters are more complicated for our 
system’s spot market than in standard spot markets of storable commodities, since this 
good is non-storable and that the resource provisioning has to be transparent to the 
buyer. 
3.3 Future Market for Computing Resources 
The futures market for computing resources is actually a directory service 
containing the offers (respectively requests) for resources that are made available 
(respectively demanded) in a certain time interval. This index of offers and requests is 
searchable and visible to both bidders and providers. This market for futures 
complements the spot market. The futures and derivatives are contracts that denote 
the obligation of a buyer (respectively seller) to buy (respectively sell) at a certain 
agreed price. 
3.4 Requirements for a Market Mechanism for Trading Computing Resources 
After introducing briefly the spot and futures market for computing resources, we 
proceed to provide additional details regarding the unit that is to be traded in these 
markets (i.e. unit of trade), the format of spot market bids/asks and the futures market 
requests/offers, the matching algorithm to be adopted, and, finally, how bids and asks 
are routed in this system. 
3.4.1. Unit of Trade 
Prior to proceeding with the presentation of the GridEcon market mechanism, we 
define the unit that is to be traded in the Grid market place. Obviously, the unit must 
be suitable for the types of Grid applications currently existing or emerging. 
Computing resource providers offer different types of virtual machines (VMs) for 
leasing. It is expected that these resources be offered for a minimum desirable price 
and for a certain time duration within a specific time interval, depending on the 
providers’ supply constraints. An assumption of our model for both the spot and the 
futures market throughout the paper is that time is discretized in time slots. Note that 
a virtual machine does not just correspond to a certain computational speed but rather 
to an entire configuration. The unit of trade, i.e. the VM, is defined through the CPU 
speed, the size of the main memory, and the size of the harddrive. 
Depending on the nature of the tasks that consumers may wish to execute, their 
demand can be expressed in a multitude of ways. A general type of contract is 
specified by means of the number of VMs and the time duration. For instance, a 
company’s Web server leases Grid resources when it is critically loaded. This type of 
consumer need can also be graphically depicted by means of a rectangle (see Fig. 1).  
 
Now     +1hr       +2hrs       +3hrs    +4hrs 
 
 
 Consumer desires 4 VMs for 3 hours 
 
    
Fig. 1. A consumer’s demand for 4 VMs over 3 hours is depicted as a rectangle. 
The height of the rectangle denotes the number of virtual machines required at any 
time of the interval, while the width of the rectangle denotes the amount of time for 
which these machines are needed. 
Another type of contract could be specified by means of computational volume, i.e. 
a total number of VMs must be made available up to a maximum deadline constraint, 
so that a certain computationally intensive task can be executed in time. As opposed 
to the previous case, only the total quantity of computational power is of interest, 
while the rate of computation provided at the various time epochs is not. This could 
be the case for data parallel applications. In this case, the consumer needs do no 
longer correspond to rectangles but rather to areas of rectangles, possibly with a 
maximum width constraint (i.e. deadline). Since this type of contract can be also 
expressed (with some effort on the consumer side) in the market place through the 
earlier type of contract, we will focus on the earlier contract type. 
3.4.2. Format of the Bid/Ask 
A bid in our system describes the resources required by the buyer. The resources 
are specified according to:  
(1) The type of resource (VM) required,  
(2) The quantity of resources (the number of VMs) required,  
(3) The start time of the interval for using the resources (VM),  
(4) The time duration of using the resources,  
(5) The price expressed in €/min/unit, and  
(6) The time limit until which the bid is valid. If the time limit is reached without 
the bid being matched, the bid is removed from the system.  
In order to keep the definition of the bid as general and flexible as possible, instead 
of allowing only fixed values for the number of VMs and the time duration, we allow 
that the bid can specify whether these constraint values should be met with equality or 
< or >. Our system also considers two additional constraints regarding the total 
expenditure and the total volume of computation (see the “Rectangle” column in 
Table 1). Therefore, since each bid is associated with a set of relation constraints, this 
allows a richer ontology of bids. A meaningful subset of this ontology is depicted in 
Table 1. 
 





= = Redundant Redundant 
< < Optional Required Relations: 
≥ ≥ Required Redundant 
Table 1: Meaningful combinations of constraints for bids. 
There are two types of bids in our system, namely future and spot bids. Future bids 
(or equivalently requests) are the bids for which the start and end times are fixed. For 
instance, a request could be: “User X bids for 5 VMs of type A to be used for 5 hrs, 
starting at time 13:00, with price 0.5 €/min/unit”. As opposed to requests, spot bids 
demand to utilize resources as soon as they are available. Spot bids are distinguished 
from requests by setting the start time to a specific value (e.g. 0) and by the fact that 
the start time and the end time are continuously moving as time passes. This is 
performed as long as the bid has not been matched (and up to the maximum time 
allowed by the expiry of the bid). For instance, a spot bid is: “User X bids for 5 VMs 
of type A to be used for 5 hrs, starting at time 0, with bid price 0.5 €/min/unit, and 
time limit 20:00”. In this example, the bid could be executed with a start time of 
20:00 the latest.  
An ask in our system describes the resources offered, which are specified by the 
following five parameters:  
(1) The type of resources (i.e. VM) offered,  
(2) The quantity of resources (i.e. number of VMs) offered,  
(3) The start time and the end time of the interval when the resources are 
available,  
(4) The price, expressed in €/min/unit, and  
(5) The time limit for which the ask is valid (the expiration time of the offer). That 
means, the ask will be removed from the system after this time limit.  
Similar to bids, there are also two types of asks, namely future and spot asks. 
Future asks (or equivalently offers) are those for which the start time and the end time 
are fixed instants in the future. For offers, the end time equals the start time plus the 
duration, while the time limit also has the same value by default. For instance, an 
offer looks like: “Provider Y offers for leasing 2 VMs of type A to be used for 8 hrs, 
starting at time 15:00, with a price of 0.2 €/min/unit”. On the contrary, spot asks offer 
resources that can be utilized as soon as there is demand for them. Such asks are 
distinguished from offers by setting the start time to a specific value (e.g. 0). Their 
main difference to offers is the fact that the start time and end time of asks are 
continuously moving as time passes. This continues as long as the ask is not matched 
(up to the maximum time allowed by the expiry of the ask). Therefore, spot asks are 
more flexible than offers. They offer service of a certain duration over a larger time 
interval. For instance, a spot ask is: “Provider Y offers 2 VMs of type A to be used for 
3 hrs, starting at time 0, with an ask price of 0.2 €/min/unit, and a time limit of 
19:00”. 
3.4.3. Matching Algorithm 
The matching algorithm defines how a bid (respectively request) in the spot market 
(respectively futures market) is matched by a set of asks (respectively offers). For 
simplicity reasons, it suffices to adopt a matching algorithm that passes the queues 
once. In our presentation below, we focus on the spot market. Indeed, the matching 
algorithm in the futures market is much simpler than that of the spot queue, since the 
time span of all requests and offers is fully specified, i.e. their start time and end time 
are decided upon their submission and cannot be changed subsequently, as opposed to 
spot bids/asks. 
Trading in the spot market is performed by means of a continuous double auction 
mechanism. This is an extension of the standard spot market mechanism. Similarly to 
the standard mechanism, the spot bids and asks submitted by traders are placed in the 
bid queue and the ask queue respectively. Each queue is ordered according to the 
price and time of submission, with the bid queue being sorted in decreasing order of 
price, and the ask queue being sorted in increasing order of price. If two or more 
orders at the same price appear in a spot queue, then they are entered by time with 
older orders appearing ahead of newer orders. An order remains in the queue until it is 
removed by the system due to order expiration, removal by the user, or if a matching 
had occurred.  
Moreover, the matching algorithm takes into account that spot asks may start 
providing resources at some later time than now, due to the flexibility associated with 
the provision of resources. Note that we refrain from adopting a combinatorial 
approach due to the high computational complexity.  
The matching algorithm for the spot offers is as follows: It initially computes the 
candidate matches to an ask by means of creating a matrix. Each column of the matrix 
corresponds to a time slot (i.e. the time interval in which service can be provided). 
Each row corresponds to a provider that can offer service now, with the cheapest 
being on the top row. A cell of the matrix is marked if the provider can offer 
computing resources during this specific time slot.  
Then, the algorithm attempts to perform a probabilistic matching. In particular, the 
algorithm starts with the cheapest ask and randomly fills some time slots of bids, so 
that the provider’s resource availability becomes zero. This means the cheapest ask is 
fully utilized. It then proceeds with the next cheapest ask and does the same. Note, 
after the second step, there might be slots allocated to two candidate providers. For 
these slots, each provider is assigned a probability of moving from this slot. A 
provider is moved to an empty slot according to a transition probability, which is 
larger for providers of this slot if they could serve a target slot where the number of 
providers that could serve the target slot is small.  
The algorithm terminates when all the slots are assigned to some provider and thus 
a match is found. In case there are slots where there is no provider serving it, while 
there are not any slots with more than one provider, the algorithm has failed to 
compute a match. Due to the fact that we use a probabilistic matching algorithm, the 
algorithm can be repeated for a maximum pre-specified number of times until it 
terminates. If it fails, then it attempts to compute a match for the next time slot, i.e. 
for the time interval [Now + 1 slot, Now + 1 slot + service duration]. This is repeated 
until a match is indeed found or the algorithm fails for all time slots (i.e. entire 
duration) for which the bid is valid. 
3.4.4. Routing of Bids and Asks 
It is the responsibility of the matching module to be invoked periodically, prior to 
the beginning of the next slot, in order to compute matches and remove expired bids 
and asks from the bid/ask queue of the spot market and requests and offers from the 
futures directory of the futures market. The results of the matching procedure are 
subsequently passed to the scheduler, the reservation system of the provider, and the 
accounting system of the market place.  
4 Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper, we discussed the rationale for a Grid market for leasing computing 
resources as well as the relevant key requirements. The GridEcon market place has 
one major advantage over existing utility computing services (e.g. Amazon’s EC2 
service, Sun, HP, and IBM). It allows companies not only to access computing 
resources, but also to sell spare computing resources. However, in the GridEcon 
market place, not all providers need also to be consumers and vice versa. Furthermore, 
the low market power of the participant of the Grid market ensures that the price, 
though flexible, remains highly competitive. Therefore, not considering market lock-
in (i.e. high switching cost), network externalities, or anti-competitive behavior of 
market leaders, a group of many small computing resource providers (i.e. any 
company with spare computing resources) could compete with IBM, Google, and 
Amazon.  
The market place for computing resources has certain similarities to the electricity 
market place. Indeed, since the market price is directly related to demand and supply, 
it will provide incentives for companies to adapt their usage strategies (e.g. buy more 
and own less computing power; compute during the night only). Moreover, 
companies will adjust their in-house computing usage to the competitive market price. 
Since the market place allows reselling resources that have been purchased, a 
company can buy resources on the market for a longer time period and resell those 
resources that are not needed at a shorter time scale. 
Finally, the Grid market opens opportunities for a wide range of services (such as 
insurances, and capacity planning). Those value-added services on top of the market 
place will provide functionality that addresses certain needs of users. Such additional 
services may also be developed in some of the aforementioned existing utility 
computing services. However, it is likely that these services will be developed in such 
a way that it ultimately increases the profit of the provider, which is of course 
detrimental to buyers of the computing resources. 
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